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MAKINGSTATISTICALINFERENCESABOUT
SOFTWARE LIABILITY
by
DouElas R. Miller
I. Introduction
This paper presents some aspects of the statistical analysis of
software reliability. The purpose is to point out some open problems
and difficulties in the area, rather than to present solutions or new
methods. This will be done first by considering moderate levels of
reliability and a class of models (Exponential Order Statistic models)
that appear to be useful. These moderate levels of reliability are
characterized by the feasibility of testing for time durations that are
at least an order of magnitude longer than desired mean times between
failures. The second and primary concern of this paper is ultrahigh
reliability, such as that occurring when failure rates are below one in
one billion; for example, when failures occur at the rate of one per one
billion missions, or one per one billion instances of using a program,
or once per one billion units of operating time. In this case it is
usually infeasible to test for a time duration even approaching the
desired mean time between failures. Furthermore, it may be impossible
to develop testing procedures which are sufficiently representative of
field usage. It is highly questionable whether the statistical analyses
useful at moderate levels of reliability are of any use here. Indeed,
2it is unclear what role statistical methods can play in the verification
of such ultrareliable software.
Whena piece of software is put in service to perform some
function, it mayor maynot perform as desired. If it has been
carefully and skillfully developed, it will probably work as desired
most of the time; however, it may occasionally not perform as required.
A priori, there is uncertainty about how well it will perform. One
approach is to model this uncertainty using probability theory and use
statistical methods to make inferences about it. We would like to be
able to translate everything we know about the software into estimates
of how the software performs in the field. There is actually a vast
amount of information available and fairly detailed aspects of
performance which are of interest. For purposes of statistical
reliability analysis, most information is ignored and the performance
measure is often reduced to a failure rate. The statistical problem
becomes one of estimating future failure rate from observed failures
(which could have occurred during development, debugging, testing, or
field usage). This is a highly simplified model of the situation, but
it is still statistically rich and useful for situations in which
sufficient data, i.e., failure data, can be collected.
2. A Model for Software Failure
Let us consider a model of software bugs and usage that will lead
to observed failure times that are order statistics of independent,
nonidentically distributed exponential random variables. We assume that
the software operates by receiving data from some input space and
transforming them into output data, which are either correct or
3incorrect. This is done for a sequence of inputs selected randomly and
independently from the space of all possible inputs according to some
distribution over the input space. We assume that the internal state of
the computer is identical for each input. If a subset, F, of the input
space corresponds to inputs for which a certain bug in the software
causes an incorrect output and the input distribution gives probability
p to F, then in the above scenario this bug will have geometrically
distributed interfailure times with mean i/p. If p is small the
interfailure time distribution can be approximated by an exponential
distribution. If a bug is removed (perfect fix) when it manifests
itself in an incorrect output, then we see a single exponentially
distributed waiting time until manifestation. We further assume that
the probability of simultaneous occurrence of more than one bug on any
input is negligible; this allows us to model the separate manifestation
times as independent continuous random variables. To summmarize: the
Exponential Order Statistic (EOS) model can be described as follows. Let
0 _ T _ T _ T _ ... _ T _ ...
x 2 3 j
be random variables corresponding to manifestation times of bugs in a
piece of software. Each bug has a failure rate associated with it; if
the bugs are arbitrarily indexed, then k. is the failure rate of the
x
ith bug. Let X i equal the occurrence time of the ith bug:
P[X. > t] = exp(-X.t).
1 1
The random variables [Xi, i = 1,2,3,...} are independent and their
order statistics can be denoted as {Tj, j = 1,2,3,...}. See Miller [7]
and Scholz [II] for more information about EOS models.
It is important to consider the assumptions made by the EOS
model:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Successive inputs are independently drawn from a single usage
distribution, i.e., independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) inputs.
Internal machine state is identical for each input.
Bug fixes are perfect.
There is no bug interaction.
It is equally important to note the absence of any assumptions about the
failure rates
k I, k2, k3, ..., ki, ....
They can be any finite set of values, or any infinite set of values for
which
_o
_= k <_.i I i
There are some properties and special cases of EOS models that
are of interest. If the rates (k. 's) are chosen randomly from some
I
distribution or as realizations of some nonhomogeneous Poisson process
(NHPP), we get the family of doubly stochastic EOS models. This family
of models is of special interest because of its richness--it contains
all failure occurrence processes which are nonhomogeneous Poisson
processes with completely monotone intensity functions. Many of the
well-known parametric families of reliability growth models can be
obtained in this way. For example, the Musa-Okumoto [8] model is a
doubly stochastic EOS model with k's from an NHPP with intensity
m(k) = yk-lexp(-_k).
In a certain sense this is a noisy version of Nagel's [9,10] log-linear
failure rate model, where
k
i
5
i
= 6_ , i = 1,2,3, ....
Consequently, assuming a parametric model often may be tantamount to
assuming a particular pattern or distribution of the bug failure rates;
for example, the Jelinski-Moranda [5] model assumes they are all
identical. When viewed in this light it seems hard to imagine that
there could be one pattern (or a few) of failure rate distribution which
always arises to the exclusion of all others• It would make the
inference much easier if it were true. If it is not true, it can cause
severe estimation errors when one is trying to predict reliability,
especially in the ultrareliable case.
Nagel's log-linear model is thought by some to be a possible
candidate for a special prevalent pattern; but that would require much
more justification. One problem is that the pattern is not closed under
superposition, which would seem a desirable property inasmuch as it
represents the combining of two programs into one. Suppose a software
system consists of two modules, A and B, each of which is executed once
for each application of the program. If the log-linear model were a
universal model, then it would apply to both modules separately and to
A B Bthe system as a whole. Let AA = [k , k2, ...] and AB = [kl, k 2 .... ]
be the failure rates per application of the bugs in module A and module B,
k9
respectively. If = 6A(eA )I and = 6B(=B )i i = 1,2,3 .... then itk?1 1 ' '
can be shown that the failure rates of the bugs in the system,
AS = AA U AB, do not in general exhibit a log-linear pattern.
It is useful to consider inference within the context of these
Exponential Order Statistic models because it makes certain difficulties
very apparent. In a sense the EOS models provide one possible
6"best-case situation." Because many of the parametric models are
special cases of EOS models, the same difficulties almost certainly
apply to them. Some of the problems are:
(i) In order to make inferences about how the software will perform
in the field, we must know the input domain as well as the input
distribution that will be encountered.
(ii) The i.i.d, input assumptions for successive executions might be
appropriate to certain batch types of application programs, but
not to other software such as systems software or real time
control software.
(iii) These models gloss over the problems of identification of
separate bugs, imperfect fixes, dependencies between bugs and
other factors which tend to make for messy data.
(iv) The richness of the possible models and some undesirable
properties of completely monotone functions make accurate
prediction difficult. (See Figure 4 and the accompanying
discussion.)
3. Reliability Prediction
The prediction problem is of special interest for software
maintenance. An estimate of the number of new bugs that will appear
during some future time interval can be useful in planning. Using the
EOS paradigm we see that this is a difficult problem because two
completely monotone intensities can agree quite closely over a finite
interval and then diverge over a future interval. They may agree
closely enough that it is impossible to say which one best fits the
data. This is illustrated by a sequence of figures: Figure 1 shows
7somefailure data, the cumulative number of bugs manifested by time t,
0 _ t _ 100. Figure 2 shows two possible models; the straight line is
M(t) = t/2
and the curved line is
M(t) = 47 log(.01t + l)/log 2.
These can represent the expected number of occurrences in NHPPs; the
first is actually a homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) and the second is
a case of the Musa-Okumoto model. The HPP is a limiting case of the EOS
paradigm; the M-O model is an actual case of a doubly stochastic EOS
model. Thus if one believes the EO$ paradigm, both of these models must
be considered. In Figure 3 the data are superimposed on the two mean
functions. The point of Figure 3 is that the noise in the data is of
the same or greater magnitude as the difference between the two models.
Both models would probably pass hypothesis tests as the true model.
Figure 4 shows the models extrapolated into the future. The two models
differ by a factor of approximately two in the expected number of events
in the interval [100,200]. This sequence of figures conveys a feeling
for the randomness and the possible imprecision that arise when the
number of future bugs is predicted from the occurrence times of previous
bugs. The data were generated on a hand calculator from the HPP with
M(t) = t/2. It seems that there are definite limitations to the
inferences that can be made in the absence of additional inform_ation
that will restrict the family of admissible models.
Reliability growth models have been used successfully in eases
with moderate levels of reliability. For example, Currit, Dyer, and
Mills [I] successfully use such models for a system in which they cite
failure rates very roughly in the neighborhood of one failure per 5000
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test cases. However, obtaining ultrahigh reliability through
reliability growth requires very long testing. Bey Littlewood has
observed the following interesting phenomenon, which the reader may
check for himself: For the data used by Musa and Okumoto [8], the
current reliability (as measured by the current time between failures)
is at best in the neighborhood of I/i00 of the total accumulated test
time and for higher reliability it could be less than I/I000. These
types of data, in which a fair number of failures is observed and the
program is not ultrareliable, seems to be the appropriate domain for
using statistical software reliability models. There may be value in
getting estimates that are not extremely precise or in which we do not
have an extremely high level of confidence. To this end probability
models with incorrect assumptions can be used; the resulting
approximations are acceptable and useful.
The general problem addressed above is to make inferences about
future performance based on past performance of the software and any
additional information. There are many open problems in modelling and
inference with reliability growth data. Three main performance measures
of interest are current reliability, expected number of bugs to be
discovered over a future time interval, and additional debugging time to
reach a desired level of reliability. In making inferences about these
quantities, some open problems are:
(i) Determining accuracy of point estimates, perhaps by using
confidence intervals.
(ii) Incorporating more information into inference procedures.
(iii) Finding ways to justify restricted classes of reliability growth
models.
13
(iv) Correcting for uncertainty in the field usage distribution.
(v) Considering different sampling schemes, e.g., replicated
debugging runs.
(vi) Quantifying the limitations of a purely statistical inference
approach.
(vii) Handling imperfect fixes.
(viii) Distinguishing whether problems with accuracy are arising from
bad models or from good models that have bad inference
characteristics.
There is definitely a need for more sophisticated statistical
techniques. They can be very useful as management tools. There seems
to be opportunity for the mathematical statistical community to
contribute more to this area. Correct and precise statistical analysis
seems especially important for software which must be ultrareliable for
safety reasons; but this may be an inherently different problem than the
usual software reliability growth scenario, which addresses moderate
levels of reliability.
4. Analysis of Ultrareliable Software
Software used in real-time control of safety-critical systems
must be ultrareliable. The software in digital flight control computers
aboard commercial aircraft will be critical to flight safety.
Reliability on the order of 10 -9 failures per hour or per mission is
desired. Even trying to quantify such high reliability with statistical
parameter values is very difficult and may be meaningless. The Radio
Technical Commission for Aeronautics refrained from quantifying the
reliability; in "Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and
14
Equipment Certification," DO-178A, they say:
"During the preparation of this document, techniques for estimating
the post-verification probabilities of software errors were
examined. The objective was to develop numeci_al requirements for
such probabilities for digital computer-based equipment and systems
certification. The conclusion reached, however, was that currently
available methods do not yield results in which confidence can be
placed to the level required for this purpose. Accordingly, this
document does not state post-verification software error requirements
in these terms."
In Advisory Circular No. 25.1309-1 the FAA uses the value 10 -9 to
characterize "extremely improbable." Such events would be unlikely to
occur during the entire lifetime of a fleet of aircraft. To see some
rationale for this number, consider the following rough calculation: A
single plane with a 30-year lifetime flies approximately 104 days, at
most I0 hours per day. So a fleet of 103 planes would accumulate at
most 108 flisht hours. We would expect 0.I0 occurrences of an event
with 10 -9 probability durin_ this time. The Poisson distribution is a
good model for such rare events; so the probability of no occurrences is
exp(-O.lO) = .90, which is somewhat unlikely.
In theory, statistical verification of any level of reliability
is possible. In practice, we encounter at least three major
difficulties: the usage distribution used in testing may not perfectly
fit the usage distribution encountered in the field; fixes may be
imperfect; test time may be limited. The usage distribution is a severe
problem: it may be desirable to bias the test distribution to go after
bugs which the tester thinks are more likely to be in the software, but
15
perfect knowledge of the field usage distribution is needed to remove
this bias in estimating the reliability. The problem of imperfect fixes
can be avoided by considering the software to be completely new after
each fix and thus not trying to base inferences about failure rate on
previous versions. Furthermore it is unlikely that bugs would be
allowed to remain in the program after they have been detected, so each
version would be tested until it fails; then it becomes a new version.
So an estimate of reliability would be based on failure-free tests. In
order to have any degree of confidence that the failure rate is less
than 10 -9 failures/hour, it is necessary to test for more than 109 hours
and experience no failures.
Confidence intervals for failure probabilities based on
error-free testing can be derived as follows. Let p denote the unknown
probability of failure on a given randomly chosen test case. Suppose n
test cases are run with no failure observed. In general, when n is
large and p is small, the number of failures will be a random variable,
X, with a Poisson distribution with mean _ = np:
P(X = x) = e _ /x! , x = 0,1,2, ....
Thus we have observed data to which this model assigns probability
-_ -np
P(X = 0) = e = e
The values of p for which these data are not statistically significant
at level e are those satisfying
-np
_ P(X = O) = e
or
p _ -loge/n ,
which constitutes a I00(I-_)% confidence interval for p, if n test cases
are run without failure.
intervals are:
16
For various confidence levels the confidence
Confidence Level Confidence Interval
95% p < 3.00/n
99% p < 4.61/n
99.9% p < 6.91/n
99.99% p < 9.21/n
99.999% p < ll.51/n
For example, to be 99% confident that the failure probability is less
than 10 -9 requires 4.6 x 109 test eases without failure. If th_ unit of
time is hours, this equals 525,000 years. (A more simplistic approach
of 109 failure free hours is still equal to 114,000 years of testing.)
A side issue is that the software would have to be much more reliable
than 10 -9 in order to survive 4.6 x 109 test cases without failing.
Thus, infeasibly long testing times are necessary to verify high
reliability and they probably would not work anyway because knowing the
field input distribution precisely enough is a problem.
5. Bayesian Analysis
A Bayesian analysis of the reliabililty of software is attractive
because it provides a way to incorporate more information into the
inference. There is a lot of information available in addition to
failure data during a software analysis. For example, if the software
has been subjected to formal correctness-proving and has survived, this
would improve perceived reliability while not guaranteeing perfection.
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All this information could be incorporated into a prior distribution on
the failure rate of the program. However, this only allows escape from
huge samples when the software is acceptable a priori. The following
example illustrates this: Suppose we assume the prior
P(failure rate = 0) = .99
P(failure rate = 10 -6 ) = .01.
The prior mean is 10 -8 which is close to 10 -9 but not quite acceptable.
(Whether the mean is the appropriate measure is another question.)
Previously we showed that we wanted an event to be unlikely during 108
time units. Consider n test cases without a failure, then
-6 8 8
n P(f.r. = I0 {Data) E(events in i0 ) P(O events in I0 )
0 .010
5
I0
i .368
.00906 .9 .407
.00370 .37 .691
.00000046 .000046 .99995
6
I0
7
I0
We see that it is necessary to have a sample that is larger than the
MTBF (lO 6 executions, in this case) of the bug which may only be present
with .01 probability. This illustrates what appears to be a general
property of the Bayesian approach: If the software is considered good
enough a priori, no data are needed. If the software is good enough but
the a priori feeling is that it is not quite good enough, then a large
sample is needed. Such an extreme prior as given here also might not be
viewed as credible.
In the above two analyses, a difficulty arises from the two-stage
aspect of this problem. The first stage is whether a bug is present.
18
The second stage is whether the bug manifests itself.
Bayesian prior distribution we have two possibilities:
In the above
a perfect
program, or a flawed program which we can expect to fail I00 times
during the lifetime of the design. If this second possibility occurs,
the design will have to be modified, perhaps bankrupting the designer;
this has probability .01. It is not clear that the mean of the prior
plays a very significant role. A similar two stake feature occurs in
the previous confidence interval approach: in this case it can be
described in terms of "process" versus "product." The confidence level
describes a property of the process of producing or testing software.
To say we are 99% confident of having a good piece of software (one with
failure rate 10 -9 ) sounds rather strange. So with these very high
reliabilities, there seem to be some questions of interpretation of
inference statements.
6. Analysis of Fault-Tolerant Software
There are two aspects of high reliability for safety-critical
applications: achievement and verification. Fault tolerance has been
used successfully to achieve very high levels of reliability; see the
recent Proceedings of the International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant
Computing [2]. One approach to software fault tolerance is n-version
software. This allows for higher system design reliablity than that of
individual components. Thus if higher software reliability is sought by
using n-version programming, we should also be able to exploit this fact
in making reliability verification. However, we encounter the problem
that separate software components do not a priori fail independently (as
can be assumed in hardware models). Eckhardt and Lee [3] have shown
19
theoretically why independence fails and Knight and Leveson [6] have
shown experimentally that programs which are independently created will
show dependencies in failing.
Consider a two-out-of-three software system in which three
independently created versions of the software perform the same
computational tasks and then use a flawless majority voter. Let FS
denote system failure and F. denote failure of the ith component,
1
i = 1,2,3; then
P(F ) : P(F N F ) + P(F A F ) + P(F (] F )
S I 2 I 3 2 3
- 2P(F N F A F )
i 2 3
This may be manipulated into an equivalent expression:
P(F ) = P(F )P(F ) + P(F )P(F ) + P(F )P(F )
S I 2 I 3 2 3
- 2P(F )P(F )P(F )
I 2 3
+ (P(F O F ) - P(F )P(F )) + (P(F O F ) - P(F )P(F ))
I 2 I 2 I 3 I 3
+ (P(F A F ) - P(F )P(F ))
2 3 2 3
- 2(P(F O F N F ) - P(F )P(F )P(F ))
i 2 3 I 2 3
In the second expression for P(F S) the last four terms are covariances
which disappear if the three versions fail independently of one
another. (The interpretation of these terms as "covariances" can be
seen by considering the random variables Xl, X 2, and X 3, where X.1 = I if
= 0 otherwise. By definition CoV(Xl,X 2)component i fails and X i
= E(XIK 2 - EXIEK 2) = EXIX 2 - EXIEX 2 = P(XIX 2 = I) - P(X 1 = l)P(X 2 = i)
= P(F 1 A F2) - P(FI)P(F2).) If independence cannot be assumed these
covariance terms must be estimated or bounded in some way. The
difficulty is that in order for the three-version system to be a
20
significant improvementover the one-version system, the covariance
terms must be very close to zero and this must be verified in order to
verify the system reliability. So wemust verify that
-9
P(F N F ) < I0
i j
Hence we are back to the original problem which requires a huge sample,
accurate knowledge of the usage domain and distribution, and so on. Any
statistical approach that claims to support ultrareliability based on a
moderate amount of data is almost certainly based on assumptions;
verification of these assumptions would require a huge amount of data.
7. Conclusion
It is difficult to prove something is impossible, but the
evidence suggests that a formal statistical verification of reliability
will be impossible for various safety critical systems. The best
software development and evaluation techniques will be used and huge
amounts of documentation, as well as extensive testing, will be required
for certification. But it is unlikely that this can be formed into a
statistically rigorous verification. It is also fairly certain that
such systems will be built. On the other hand, systems (such as
bridges) have been built which turned out to be ultrareliable
posteriori. The initial verification seems more elusive than the
achievement of ultrareliability.
21
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